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Inference to the Best Explanation 37
Having tasted lots of lemons I conclude that all lemons are bitter. I have good 
reason to think this, but this conclusion does not necessarily follow from the 
limited evidence that I have; the premisses could be true and the conclusion 
false. Induction leads to conclusions that are likely to be true, or that are prob-
ably true, rather than to ones that are certainly true. Such reasoning aims to 
extend our knowledge: the content of inductive conclusions goes beyond the 
content of the relevant premisses. A claim is made about all lemons from my 
experience of only some lemons. Induction can therefore involve arguments 
of different strengths: if I taste a million lemons, all bitter, I have more reason 
to think that all lemons are bitter than if I taste only ten. Such reasoning is 
contrasted with deduction: this involves the drawing of conclusions that 
must be true if the premisses are true; deductive conclusions are certain, not 
probable. Induction used to refer only to induction by enumeration, but the 
term now covers a wider range of non-deductive inferences. See also
DEDUCTION; INDUCTION BY ENUMERATION; LOGIC, INDUCTIVE. [DOB]
Induction by Enumeration. Induction by enumeration is the simplest form 
of inductive reasoning. From the premise that all observed Fs have been G,
the conclusion is drawn that all Fs are G. From the fact that all the peas I have 
seen have been green, I infer that all peas are green. There is also a probabil-
istic form of this kind of inference: from the premise that 1% of opened 
oysters have contained pearls, the conclusion is drawn that 1% of all oysters 
contain pearls. See also INDUCTION; LOGIC, INDUCTIVE. [DOB]
Inference. An inference is an action of drawing a conclusion from a set of 
premisses, data or evidence. A good or valid inference is such that its prem-
isses justify its conclusion. While we have no general theory of what sets of 
premisses count as a justification for a conclusion, the special case of deduct-
ive inference is well understood. Validity in this case reduces to the ordinary 
notion of logical consequence which has been the primary business of logic 
since its inception. On the other hand we still lack a satisfying account of the 
validity of even more widespread inferences, especially inductive inferences. 
See also INDUCTION; INFERENCE, RULES OF; LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE; PREMISS; VALIDITY. [HG]
Inference to the Best Explanation. A method of reasoning, also known as 
abduction, in which the truth of an hypothesis is inferred on the grounds that 


































to the best explanation (IBE) is an ampliative (i.e., non-deductive) method. In 
cases where a is not only the best explanation of b but a also entails b then 
IBE is formally equivalent to the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent.
However, IBE does not license inferring a merely on the basis of the fact that 
a entails b. Criticisms of IBE come in both local and global varieties. Locally, 
such inferences are always defeasible because one can never be sure that all 
potential explanations have been found and hence that there is not some 
better, hitherto undiscovered explanation of the given evidence. Globally, 
some philosophers have questioned the grounds for taking explanatoriness as 
a guide to truth in the first place. There is also the practical issue of determin-
ing criteria for the comparison of different explanations, perhaps borrowing 
from more general criteria of theory choice such as simplicity, fruitfulness, 
expressive power and so on. There has been a tendency to see IBE as a distinct-
ive feature of the empirical sciences. However, there are reasons for thinking 
that IBE may also play a role in the formal sciences, including both logic and 
mathematics, when it comes to choosing axioms. Thus a rationale for favour-
ing one particular set of axioms may be that it provides the best explanation 
of the core results in the theory under scrutiny. See also ABDUCTION; AXIOM;
FALLACY; INDUCTION. [ABa]
Inference, Rules of. Logical proofs are comprised of inference steps, which 
must conform to prevailing rules of inference. Typically, each rule specifies the 
logical form of the proposition(s) from which a proposition of a given form 
may be derived. Inference rules should be sound in the sense that they must 
not license invalid inferences. Where possible, proof systems are also expected 
to be ‘complete’: permitting the derivation of all valid inferences.
All proof systems include at least one inference rule. ‘Hilbert-style’ presenta-
tions contain only one rule, typically modus ponens, supplemented by axioms. 
However, Gerhard Gentzen’s natural deduction presentations are comprised 
solely of inference rules. Natural deduction is so-called because it mimics the 
informal reasoning of practicing mathematicians, something axiomatic 
systems fail to do. Most modern textbook accounts of proof are descended 
from Gentzen’s work.
Gentzen’s version of natural deduction provides each connective with intro-
duction and elimination rules, respectively, permitting the derivation of a 
proposition containing the connective from other propositions in which the 
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